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At a crucial point in the history of human life, imperial China decided to scrap the technology of 
interoceanic shipping and navigation that, if pursued, might well have converted the central historical 
scheme of European westward expansion to an alternative tale of Oriental eastward exploration in the 
New World.1  
Stephen Jay Gould (1941-2002), Harvard biologist and historian of science.  
Recent scholarship on global history (e.g., Pomeranz 2000; Wong 1997) has criticized the 
Eurocentric portrait (e.g. Landes 1998) of the long-term backwardness of ‘the East’. 
Pomeranz argued that Europe only superceded China in development around 1700. Most 
modern scholarship agrees to this new interpretation, but most scholars think the date was 
earlier by a hunded years or less than the date suggested by Pomeranz. This paper will not 
discuss when the West superceded China, but rather discuss some of the mechanisms as to 
why this happened, and also why Europe seems to be consciously promoting the same forces 
which weakened China and started a process of decline some 400 years ago.   
In this paper we argue that a key element in China’s relative decline – as compared to the 
West – during the 16th to 18th century, lies in the elimination of diversity under a consolidated 
and centralized  regime with few ambitions for territorial and colonial expansion. During the 
same period, or rather starting in the 1400s, Europe – and later the West in general – 
experienced a virtual explosion of intellectual creativity and development, the indispensable 
basis of which we argue was a huge diversity of polities, policies, cultures, contexts, and – 
consequently – also of opinions. In other words, simultaneously with China’s process of de-
diversification and falling behind, Europe forged ahead2 based on an explosion of increasing 
diversity. Starting with the Renaissance, Europe became a huge laboratory where a plethora of 
ideas flourished and – to a larger degree than now – this immense number of ideas were 
allowed to survive and thrive because of the existence of literally hundreds of small states, 
each with a different economic and cultural context and a different intellectual agenda.  
We would argue that the historical record shows that succesful policy making consists not in 
standardizing policies in all setting – which appears to be the present policy of the European 
Union – but rather in adapting the successful policies in foreign settings to one’s own 
context.3 Matching policies to context – e.g. successful indistrialization in anti-pope England 
to the Papal States in Italy – was the name of the successful game. We even argue that the 
Renaissance – normally perceived as a monotheistic and Catholic affair – contained an 
important injection of neo-paganism and polytheism, religious diversity, also by one of its key 
promoters.          
Today’s mainstream economics is ill-positioned to handle diversity and its implications.4 At 
its very core, in the economic heritage of Adam Smith and David Ricardo stands a de facto 
                                                
1 Gould, Stephen Jay, Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York: Harmony Books 
(Crown Publishers), 1996. 
2 „Falling behind“ and „forging ahead“ are terms introduced by Stanford economist Moses Abramowitz (1912-
2000).  
3 See Reinert, Sophus, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011. 
4 Reinert, Erik, ’The Terrible Simplifers: Common Origins of Financial Crises and Persistent Poverty in 
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negation of diversity which is rarely discussed. Smith and Ricardo’s perhaps main theoretical 
achievement was that they created order by converting the enormous diversity both in 
production and in trade into one single common denominator: labour hours. By doing this 
they sweepingly did away with diversity. At the very core of modern economics, then, stands 
an “equality assumption” 5, i.e. the absence of diversity.  
As Joseph Schumpeter argued, economics faces an eternal trade-off between accuracy and 
irrelevance. Western economics opted for the accurate but fundamentally counterintuitive 
level of abstraction – the labour-hour based economics where money is absent – founded by 
Smith and Ricardo. We all understand that labour hours spent doing surgery in a hospital are 
qualitatively different from the labour hours spent washing the floors of the same hospital, 
and that a country inhabited by surgeons would have a higher income than one inhabited by 
cleaning personnel. In terms of Ricardian logic of comparative advantage, the cleaning 
personnel would specialize in a comparative advantage in being poor.  
However, imperial power and David Ricardo’s arguments combined to convince the colonies 
– including China and Japan – that it was in their interest to let England specialize in 
manufacturing industry. It was only towards the end of the 19th century, after having signed 
long-term trade treaties with the West, that the reality of the Ricardian logic was discovered in 
China and Japan. These trade treaties with the West both in Chinese and Japanese tradition 
are still called the unfair treaties.  
This contrasts with 19th century US economics and industrial policy, which was based on an 
understanding of diversity and hierarchies sometimes expressed through a biblical metaphor: 
the US did not want to be the ’hewers of wood and drawers of water’ (Joshua 9: 21), i.e. the 
performers of menial tasks, in the global economy.6 The high level of abstraction in 
mainstream economics – labour hours – was a prerequisite for making colonialism morally 
acceptable, i.e. closing the eyes of Westerners and Europeans alike to the fact that your wealth 
did not depend on what you produced, that free trade was to everyone’s benefit.  
With modern evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter 1982) diversity was reintroduced in 
the profession. So far, unfortunately, this approach has been limited to relatively narrow 
studies of innovation and studies of innovation systems on the national level7. This paper 
addresses the wider role of diversity per se, and although it can not do much more that 
scratching the proverbial surface, we believe modern economics’ failure to incorporate the 
role of diversity has serious implications. These implications are now becoming visible in a 
relative decline of the West and the reemergence of China and Asia.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Economic Theory and the New „1848 Movement“, DESA Working Paper No. 88, 2009, in particular pp.2-3.  
5 Reinert, Erik S. 2007  
6 For a discussion of diversity and hierarchy, see Reinert, Erik S. ‘Emulation vs. Comparative Advantage: 
Competing Principles in the History of Economic Policy’. In Cimoli, Mario, Giovanni Dosi and Joseph Stiglitz 
(eds), Industrial Policy and Development; the Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation, Oxford 
University Press, 2009, pp. 79-106. 
7 This need for a broader application of evolutionary economic principles, also in development economics, was 
the logic behind the edited volume by E. Reinert (2004).  
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We argue that the neglect of diversity for a long time was the basis of standard economic 
theory, including Ricardian trade theory, and also indirectly of Western hegemony. But in 
spite of past successes from the application standard economic theory, this theory is now 
backfiring or boomeranging. The West created a set of economic theories that benefit the 
world technological leaders, and – as their leadership is now being challenged – should have 
reverted to a more defensive theory. But the West essentially started to believe in its own 
propaganda – that comparative advantage and not technological leadership is what counts –
and now experiences that its technological leadership is being eroded. 8 
Diversity and the ‘evolutionary discovery process’ have been crucial to Europe’s 
technological leadership. Eighteenth-century Europe was trying to establish a national ‘best 
practice’ from a large number of practices in a large number of different states. By contrast, 
China’s centralization and standardization in the eighteenth century stifled diversity, 
experiments, creativity and innovation. However, Europe now is losing diversity and 
becoming ‘standardized’ and ‘homogenized’ in a lot of areas from currency to bank 
supervision to standardization of shapes of cucumbers to research policy, whereas China is 
becoming a laboratory for different experiments with local reforms. Europe and China appear 
to be changing places again, just as they did some time during the 17th century.  
Diversity is clearly part of nature’s strategy for the suvival of species from natural shocks of 
all kinds, but diversity as a strategy is also consciously employed in so-called “primitive” 
societies for the same reason. In the high Andes up two twenty different species of potatoes 
are often planted in the same field. One species survives frost in the flowering season, another 
sevre drought in the growing season, etc. Among Saami reindeer herders in Northern 
Fennoscandia the degree of diversity is the most important criterion for the beauty of a herd, 
and for the same reason. Diversity represensts an insurance policy.     
This paper examines and compares the trajectories of the rise and fall of diversity in Europe 
and China and the implications of such a comparison for the future of global economy. 
Drawing on the discourses of evolutionary economics, the paper re-evaluates the changing 
nature of the ‘market’ and the institutional and legal frameworks created in order to regulate 
the market. The paper argues that the ‘market’ is much more than a mechanism setting prices, 
and that the idea of the ‘market’ should be extended to being an arena where different ideas, 
in the form of laws, types of government, efficiency of armaments, and economic policies are 
compared and tested against each other. This is crucial to the promotion of creativity and 
innovation and the future of global economy.  
Evolution and Development as Increasing Diversity. 
                                                
8 Se Mathews and Reinert, forthcoming (2013), for a discussion of this as regards energy technology.    
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 Figure 1: Increasing Diversity over Time. 
Source: Gould, Stephen Jay, Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, p. 165.  
The evolution of diversity may be illustrated through Figure 1, where the process of evolution 
co-exists with an increase of diversity in terms of biological species. The process starts from a 
common founding member at the left wall of the drawing. The founding members of a species 
are unspecialized, in the sense that they can tolerate a wide range of climates and habitats. As 
the evolution evolves randomly, more specialized species appear, some of them very large, 
those indicated in the right part of the drawing. One example of such a specialized species is a 
Chinese panda which can only survive on one species of bamboo. With this Gould proposes 
world history as a “history of expanding variation” (p. 169).      
Transferring this picture to economic diversity, each end point represents a technology and / 
or a product.9 End points that do not reach the right-hand side of the drawing are products, or 
technologies, that no longer exist. Near the left wall life and technologies are necessarily 
simple. One cannot suggest that a lion sprang out of the primeval soup, bacteria had to come 
                                                
9 This drawing was first used for the purpose of explaining economic diversity in a 1996 paper written in 
Norwegian.   
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first. Likewise, you cannot expect the Information Age to precede the Stone Age.10 Gould 
discusses the differences between biological and technological evolution, and argues that a 
main difference obviously is the speed with which technological evolution proceeds.   
Let’s say that the single starting point, on the far left in the drawing, of the wine industry is 
the recognition that fermenting grapes produces wine (unspecified wine to use Gould’s 
terminology). Then diversity is introduced, there are green and red grapes which may be 
fermented – with or without skin – and then three varieties of wine appear: red, rosé, and 
white. Adding a multitude of grape varieties that develop over time – spontaneously and as 
results of conscious breeding – employed in a huge amount of contexts (microclimates) yield 
an enormous variety of wines. The grapes grown on one side of a small hill in Piedmont in 
Italy would have one famous trade name, the same grapes grown on another side of the same 
hill will be known under a different name. 
Attempting to avoid the miserable state of ‘perfect competition’ – where no money is made – 
market economies produce great diversity. A standard supermarket in the United States may 
stock 30.000 different items. While present-day economics pays scarce attention to this 
phenomenon of diversity, it is extremely important to note that early economists, starting with 
Botero (1589) and Serra (1613 /2011) saw this increase in diversity as being the key to wealth 
creation and to bringing about the wealth of the cities (Serra 1613 / 2011).   
The argument is picked up almost 200 years later by Adam Smith under the heading of 
‘division of labour’, but one can justifiably ask what role the division of labour plays in 
today’s economics. After all economic activities became alike – reduced to labour hours – the 
division of labour became irrelevant. When increasing and diminishing returns were 
eliminated from mainstream economics in the 1930s – in order to make room for equilibrium 
– Serra’s point from 1613 disappeared: that increasing returns under a large division of labour 
was the key to wealth and that diminishing returns was the key to poverty.   
In 1841 German economist Friedrich List described the connection between diversity and 
political freedom like this:   
“This is why the population of an industrialized society is brought together in a few 
conurbations in which are concentrated a great variety of skills, productive powers, 
applied science, art and literature. Here are to be found great public and private 
institutions and associations in which theoretical knowledge is applied to the practical 
affairs of industry and commerce. Only in such conurbations can a public opinion 
develop which is strong enough to vanquish the brute force, to maintain freedom for all, 
and to insist that the public authorities should adopt administrative policies that will 
promote and safeguard national prosperity. ...” 
      
  
                                                
10 German economist Karl Bücher (1847-1930) was the foremost represenetative of a now defunct tradition of 
economics which united the study of technologies to the study of ever-increasing size of economic units, from 
tribal economies to the global economy, through various stages. For a discussion, see Reinert 2000.     
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Standardization – for and against.   
Standardization creates technological progress increasing the size of the market. However, 
traders in Early Europe faced an enormous number not only of tariffs, but also an enormous 
variety of standard measures varying from city to city. An early 16th century volume (Pasi 
1521) is a handbook comprising more than 200 pages attempting to serve as a guide for the 
bewildered tradesman. For example, the Brenta was a volume for liquids in both Switzerland 
and Italy, but in spite of the name being the same, the size of this varied considerable from 
town to town. It Renaissance Italy the length measurements were shown by metals attached to 
the church wall, so both travelling salesmen and resident customers could consult.    
In the 20th century mass production standardization was the key to wealth, both Western 
capitalism and communism were based on this principle of Fordist mass production. In that 
sense communism and capitalism were isomorphic, they employed the same productive 
principles under politically very different regimes. It may indeed be argued that a communist 
planned economy on a large scale was only possible under the Fordist paradigm, when the 
number of different products the system had to handle was limited. It may be argued that the 
timing of the collapse of the Soviet system was probably also a result of the transition from 
the Fordist mass production paradigm – with few final products – to a techno-economic 
paradigm based on information technology, flexible production, and a plethora of final 
products.    
Carlota Perez describes the challenges form Fordist mass production to the present production 
paradigm as follows:  
‘The very essence of the mass production paradigm was homogenization. The more 
you could standardize consumption patterns and the greater the mass of people 
involved, the more you could increase productivity and the higher the standard of 
living you could hope to attain for the majority. The blue uniform of Mao Tse Tung’s 
cultural revolution was only an extreme case of Ford’s original dictum "you can have 
any color, as long as it is black". So egalitarian ideas were strongly backed – probably 
unconsciously – by the nature of the emerging potential for wealth creation and “felt” 
more realistic the more this potential came to be understood.  
By contrast, the presently diffusing information technology paradigm seems to thrive 
in diversity and differentiation. Both the adaptable nature of microelectronics 
technologies and the flexibility of the modern organizations allow astonishingly high 
levels of productivity while handling diversity. Changes in product mix, in quantity 
and quality, modifications to models or adaptations to customer requirements can 
often be made automatically. Differentiation in products and markets is seen as the 
route to maximum value creation (even if increasing the volume of each segment is 
also profitable). There are tens of thousands of little "niche" markets that are 
comfortably accommodated by the distribution channels. The unconscious ideal which 
guides product and market segmentation is that of a “personalized service”.  
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All these trends towards variety would suggest that egalitarian ideas have a much 
weaker footing. But this need not be an obstacle for the construction of an effective 
solidarity program. Indeed, the present form of differentiation by income levels is not 
the only one possible. An alternative and socially welcome differentiation can take 
place “horizontally”, by multiple life-styles, fostering the flourishing of national, 
occupational or other characteristics and identities; where people are proudly different 
and socially recognized as of equal value. The most varied ways of living can provide 
equivalent levels of satisfaction, inside countries and across the planet, while creating 
favorable conditions for dynamic wealth generation through the flourishing of 
diversified worldwide production..’11    
The question here is if Chinese market-leninism might be doing a better job than European 
capitalism in the transition described above. Both the traditional and the contemporary 
Chinese governance system tell us that there are often confrontations and tensions in the 
relationships between the central government and the localities.12 Although the pre-1978 
Chinese economy is generally labelled as one of ‘central-planning’, decentralization in China 
has some roots dating back to the 1950s, in particular in the latter years of the first Five-Year 
Plan (1953-1958).13 At that time the efficiency of vertical administration was constrained by 
the variations in China’s geography, transportation conditions and communications capacity.14 
So unlike the former Soviet Union, where the strong vertical administration sidestepped local 
governments and allocated plans directly to enterprises, ‘the Maoist system decentralized 
economic and administrative power to the localities’, and most of the reform initiatives were 
from the ‘bottom up’.15 As a result, the power of provinces was expanded, and the control of a 
large number of industrial and commercial enterprises was transferred to the hands of local 
management.16 Although decentralization in the 1950s did not change the entire central-
planned scheme in the pre-1978 era, this kind of decentralization increased a certain degree of 
economic power at the local levels that survived into the 1960s and 1970s.  
In the process of marketization in the post-1978 era, the authority of the Party-state and the 
centralized control of Beijing have declined further, and the political and economic powers 
have been gradually devolved in practice to local governments. While the centre still has 
political control over the local through the system of party-sanctioned appointments of 
officials, its fiscal capacity went into decline. Decentralization is also manifested in law-
making. As Perry Keller points out, ‘the Chinese legal order therefore effectively remained 
split between the formal legal powers of the NPC, which symbolized the unitary nature of the 
state, and the administrative power of the central and … [provincial] bureaucracies to issue 
                                                
11  Perez, Carlota, ‘The Social and Political Challenge of the Present Paradigm Shift’, Oslo: Norsk Investorforum, 
Working Paper No. 5, 1997. Downloadable on http://carlotaperez.org/papers/1-thesocialandpolitical.htm#9 
12 For the central-local relationship and China’s governance system, see Ting Xu, The Revival of Private 
Property and Its Limits in Post-Mao China (London: Widey, Simmonds and Hill Publishing), 2013, 
forthcoming).  
13 See Lardy, Economic Growth and Distribution in China, 3-4.  
14 See ibid, 20.  
15 See Jean C. Oi, ‘The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy’, The China Quarterly, no. 144 
(1995): 1134.  
16 See Lardy, Economic Growth and Distribution in China, 33.  
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and enforce normative documents’.17 The term ‘federalism’ has been widely used to 
characterize the changes that have taken place in the Chinese polity.18 Scholars have 
described (albeit in different ways) the nature of the decentralization from the central to local 
governments in contemporary China as quasi-federal or simply, federal,19 although the 
Chinese political and legal systems lack the institutional infrastructure of ‘constitutional 
federalism’ and local governments in China do not have ‘formal political [and legal] 
autonomy vis-à-vis the centre’.20  Some scholars argue that the de facto federalism that has 
taken place is market-preserving and underpins economic growth in China.21  
In the process of decentralizing power from the central government to local governments, the 
previously assumed ‘zero-sum model’ of the relationship between the centre and the local is 
no longer sufficient.22 First, local governments have developed various kinds of strategy to 
cope with the central government in decentralization. In this sense, rather than preserving and 
stimulating the market, ‘federalism’ has also set up barriers to marketization. For example, 
local protectionism involved ‘the illicit and irregular use of administrative controls by local 
governments to interfere with the flow of commodities between localities’.23 Huang Yasheng 
also demonstrates that domestic capital mobilizing across regions in China is very low.24 
Secondly, some scholars also remind us of the possible check function of local governments. 
For example, various kinds of reform have conducted across different regions in China. In the 
wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, the centre could not bring these local 
reforms to a halt and restore the central planning completely, due partly to the resistance of 
local leaders.25 Thirdly, regional inequality and variations should also be taken into account 
when examining the transformation of the governance system.26 Nevertheless, this kind of 
‘involuntary’ decentralization has promoted a certain degree of diversity in China especially 
in the area of economic policy. For example, since the 1980s, Special Economic Zones have 
been set up including Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in 
Fujian Province and the entire Hainan Province. They enjoy special economic policies and 
more power in making governmental decisions. The first auction of land use rights was done 
in Shenzhen on 1 December 1987, although this practice obviously contravened the 
                                                
17 Perry Keller, ‘Sources of Order in Chinese Law’, American Journal of Comparative Law 42, no. 4 (1994):, 
723. See also the Legislation Law of the PRC (2000).  
18 See Goldstein, ‘China in Transition’: 1127.  
19 See e.g., Cao, Qian and Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style’; Huang 
Yasheng, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations During 
the Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Tsai, ‘Off Balance’: 4.  
20 See Tsai, ‘Off Balance’: 4.  
21 See e.g., Qian Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast, ‘China’s Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, 
Chinese Style’, Journal of Policy Reform 1 (1996): 149-185; Qian Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Federalism as 
a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4 (1997): 83-92; 
Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic 
Development’, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 11, no. 1 (1995): 1-31. There are also critiques on 
this arguement that it is rather ’market-thwarting federalism’, see Kellee S. Tsai, ‘Off Balance: The Unintended 
Consequences of Fiscal Federalism in China’, Journal of Chinese Political Science 9, no. 2 (2004): 1-26.  
22 See generally, Linda Chelan Li, Centre and Provinces—China 1978-1993: Power as Non-Zero-Sum (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
23 Wedeman, From Mao to Market, 17.  
24 See Huang, Selling China, 66.  
25 See Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China, 1-2.  
26 Yang Dali, Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (London: Routledge, 1997), 137-139.  
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Constitution; four months later, on 12 April 1988 the constitution was amended to allow the 
transfer of land use rights (Clause 4 of Article 10). The Chinese government has recently 
annouced its decision to open a Free Trade Zone in Shanghai with the aim to attract foreign 
investment and to boost the economy.27  
 
Yet, the extent of diversity in China should not be exaggerated. China still lacks a ’market’ of 
ideas which, in our view, is the key to the examination of the question whether China 
is ’forging ahead’.  The Chinese government has the ability to mobilize a significant amount 
of resources and money to invest into high tech. For example, China is now taking the lead by 
developing renewable energy and building its ‘green economy’.28 Human capital is 
accumulating rapidly – the number of the science and engineering degrees granted by Chinese 
universities is now comparable to US total. Yet the US (now has superseded Europe as a 
global superpower) remains the ideal place for the Chinese elites to further their studies and to 
enhance their academic or professional careers. According to the figure from a survey by the 
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education in Tennessee, ninety-two percent of the 
Chinese who gained a PhD in science and engineering in 2002 were still in the US in 2007.29 
The US continues to retain the best and the brightest Chinese students. Within China, 
becoming a civil servant, similar to the situation hundreds of years ago, remains the number 
one career choice for university graduates. Pursuing alternative careers in science and 
engineering or in private business sector seems less attractive. Chinese universities are still 
being run as government bureaus. Directors of universities hold governmental ranks. Space 
for free academic discussion and diverse modes of thought is still limited. Many scholars still 
function in the ‘velvet prison’. 30  Similarly, many high-tech and innovation schemes are still 
directed by the top-down approach. There are also many obstacles to entrepreneurship and 
innovation. For example, it is still difficult for small-sized private enterprises to access bank 
loans.31   
Standardization sometimes presents a dilemma. One the one hand it is clear that 
standardisation of measures and technological platforms allows for mass production. This is 
why the lack of standardization in Renaissance Italy – the most progressive country at the 
time – to some extent comes as a surprise. It is e.g. clear that early bandwidth standardization 
for cellular telephony achieved by the telephone companies in the Nordic countries was key in 
giving Nordic producers like Nokia and Ericson a technological advantage to run down the 
learning curve and capture volume and market share. On the other hand, not adhering to 
international standards may protect a country. Russia, having a different railway gauge from 
the rest of Europe, delayed invasion by rail and Switzerland, not adhering to building 
                                                
27 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-08/27/c_132667878.htm (accessed 27/08/2013).  
28 Mathews, John and Reinert, Erik, 2013, ’Renewable, Manufacturing and Green Growth: An Energy Stragety 
Based on Capturing Increasing Returns’, Futures (forthcoming).  
29 http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20100305112257670 (accessed 21/05/2012).  
30 Miklos Haraszti, The Velvet Prison: Artists under State Socialism, trans. Katalin Landesmann and Stephen 
Landesmann (New York: Basic Books, 1987).  
31 See Ting Xu review on Martin Jacques. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the 
Birth of a New Global Order, 2nd edition. London: Penguin Books, 2012. LSE Review of Books, available at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2012/06/16/when-china-rules-the-world-martin-jacques/#more-3286, 
published on 16 June 2012.  
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standards (e.g. widths of household equipment), efficiently protected its own producers by 
erecting high barriers to entry for foreign producers of refrigerators, stoves and washing 
machines.    
Stephen Jay Gould dreads the lack of variety in modern society: “In a society driven, often 
unconsciously, to impose uniform mediocrity upon a former richness of excellence – where 
McDonald’s drives out the local diner, and the mega-Stop & Shop32 eliminates the corner 
Mom and Pop – an understanding of full ranges as natural reality might help to stem the tide 
and preserve the rich raw material of any involving system: variation itself” (Gould pp. 229-
230).   
Like so many entities diversity comes with qualitative attributes. We may also have to 
distinguish between superficial diversity and real diversity. Superficial diversity may refer to 
having access to 10 pieces of art by the same artist or 20 different breakfast cereals in your 
local supermarket versus possessing 10 pieces of art from 10 different centuries or 20 
different technological solutions for the production of energy. What is required are 
fundamental differences, fundamentally different approaches like different general purposes, 
technologies.  
Our fear is that the European Union project fails in its balance of diversity, a failure which is a 
residual of 20th century Fordist thinking. There are arguments for standardizing vegetables – 
like the curvature of cucumbers – but standardizing fruit and vegetables also tends to deprive 
them of, yes, diversity. There are arguments that nations converging in a process UNCTAD 
once called “symmetrical development” could indeed benefit from a single currency. That 
was the original plan for the Euro – a currency for symmetrically developed core countries – 
and the key problem of the EU today is that the diversity between the strong core economies – 
which would have benefitted from a common currency – and the rest was not observed.  
Peripheral EU countries, like Italy and Greece, were still under inflationary pressures which 
had a political origin. To stem the pressures of the political extremes, these governments – 
like traditional democratic governments in Latin America – tended to spend more money that 
they had.  Inflation had been the price to pay in order to achieve political stability, and 
devaluations represented the safety valve of the system. Joining these peripheral countries in a 
currency union with the economically strong countries – not observing this crucial difference 
– lies at the core of EUs problems today. In other words, not understanding diversity lies at 
the core of Europe’s problems.  
Unifying research projects under huge umbrellas is probably not a god idea for several 
reasons. Serendipity – discovering what you did not look for but which is more interesting 
than what you looked for – may be lost. There is also a risk that interesting projects which do 
not fit under the verbal umbrellas that happen to be in fashion in the research bureaucracy 
never get funded. Decentralizing research programmes – which will come to follow different 
paths and grow apart – may prove more successful.  
                                                
32 Today the example would have been Wallmart. 
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Close observers of the growing eurobureaucracy also comment to the elitist and non-
integratory way this bureaucracy is being developed. Being isolated in Bruge, Belgium, the 
European College is an example of regional policy, but rather than bridging diversity it seems 
likely that this will develop an isolated and self-contained eurobureaucracy, of the kind the 
new European parties – The Five Star Movement in Italy, UKIP in England, and Allianz für 
Deutschland in Germany– are loathing.      
Monopolies of Power vs. Diversity and Balance of Countervailing Powers.  
The history of Florence reveals an apparently inconsistent political model. Florentine society 
balanced between oligarchy (the Medici family), corporatism (la signoría) and democracy. 
Perhaps also here the blend – the apparent lack of a coherent model – in fact not only 
represented a strength but was a key success factor. Maybe – in the name of diversity – all 
these three models of governance have their advantages.  
Before democracy, Europe went through what might have been close to a mandatory passage 
point of Enlightened Despotism, typified by the 18th century Enlightenment rulers. The 
problem with this system is of course that despotism rarely remains enlightened for a long 
time. However, the presence of enlightened philosophers was in itself a sign of prestige for 
which rulers strived, and their influence on ‘despotism’ was strong.  
The corporatist dimension guaranteed a diversity of representation across professions.33 Being 
elected through balloting for only two months at the time, the government of Florence – the 
signoría – was protected against the economic interests of a single economic and political 
group. The nine members of the signoría were required to consult with experienced 
specialized bodies (for instance for trade or war), but the main continuity of the Florentine 
political system was in the hands of the professional guilds, not – as it would have been under 
a democracy – by individuals. The fact that the financial sector, banks, was only one of the 
nine members of the signoría would presumably have prevented the financial sector from 
achieving the power it has now achieved in the West.     
As the signoría, Enlightened Despotism was also expected continuously to consult with the 
wisdom of the age. We can use Sweden as an example. During what in Swedish history is 
dubbed “The Age of Greatness”, the Swedish monarchy imported key European intellectuals. 
Dutchman Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), generally considered the father of international law, 
became a Swedish citizen and served as Sweden’s ambassador to Paris from 1635. 
Philosopher Rene Decartes (1596-1650) went to Sweden on the invitation of Queen Christina 
in 1749, but died there of pneumonia the next year. German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf 
(1632-1694), of Natural Law fame, became a professor at the university in Lund and stayed in 
Sweden from 1668 to 1688. It is important to notice that the import of this illustrious 
foreigner was part of a nationalistic campaign: the University of Lund had been re-founded in 
1666 as part of an attempt to swedify a recently acquired territory. The same cult of foreign 
knowledge – rather than of foreign capital – in order to increase national strength was at the 
                                                
33 Najeemy,  John M., A History of Florence, 1200-1575, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008. 
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core of Elizabethan England34. Still in the tradition of Giovanni Botero, strengthening the 
nation meant increasing diversity through the employment of foreigners.   
Indeed one of us has argued that one representative starting point for European civilization 
was the shift from venerating the bodies of religious Saints to venerating the bodies of dead 
philosophers. This can be exemplified with the brave and violent leader of the Venetian forces 
against the Turks – Sigismondo Malatesta, the Mastiff of Rimini (1417-1468)  –  who wanted 
to bring prestige to his native Rimini by bringing home the body of Plethon (Georgius 
Gemistus) (1389-1464) from the Peloponnese. 35 
If we are to pinpoint one politically related event which started the Western Renaissance, the 
best candidate is probably Plethon’s lectures in Florence which caught the attention of the 
ruler – Cosimo de Medici the Elder (1389-1464). Plethon’s presence in Florence led to the 
revival of Greek knowledge in Western Europe. The fact that Plethon himself was an adherent 
to polytheism – the cultivation of a pantheon of many Gods – also partly explains why the 
Renaissance did not reinforce the role of the Catholic Church, but rather increased diversity 
by bringing back competition from gods and beliefs of the past.   
As the art of the period so wonderfully testifies – e.g. in the paintings of Sandro Boticelli 
(1445-1510) – the Renaissance brought back the primitive gods and joys of life from the 
pantheon of Greek gods and their Roman counterparts. From Giovanni Botero’s cult of the 
diversity of nature and culture to Plethon as the philosopher who created the political spark 
behind the Renaissance, the key aspect – indeed a mandatory ingredient of the European 
Renaissance – was an increase in diversity.  
This stands in sharp contrast to China starting from the Ming period (1368-1644), which was 
subject to the opposite phenomenon, a decrease in diversity combined with an entrenched 
orthodoxy, public administration and law and order.  China was losing the diversity that 
existed in the Tang-Song period (618-1279) which has been recognized as the most 
prosperous period in Chinese history based upon cultural pluralism and the generation and 
diffusion of useful knowledge (proto science and technology) among cultural, intellectual and 
business networks. However, this efflorescence in Tang and Song China ended in a state of 
equilibrium. Cultural pluralism was superseded by unity.36 Although Neo-Confucianism at its 
early stage engaged in debates with other modes of thought, it matured into state orthodoxy 
under the Yuan (1271-1368) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties. Contemporary China now 
faces the same problem – the lack of cultural pluralism and the equilibrium state in its 
economic development. Whether there will be a transition from the economic and geopolitical 
‘great divergence’ to the ‘convergence’ between China and the West and China’s eventual 
                                                
34 Yungblut, Laura Young, Strangers Settled Here Amongst Us: Policies, Perceptions, and the Presence of 
Aliens in Elizabethan England, London: Routledge, 1996.  
35 For a brief discussion of Plethon and Malatesta and the role of diversity, see Reinert, Erik S. ’Emulation vs. 
Comparative Advantage: Competing Principles in the History of Economic Policy’. In Cimoli, Mario, Giovanni 
Dosi and Joseph Stiglitz (eds), Industrial Policy and Development; The Political Economy of Capabilities 
Accumulation, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 79-106. 
36 See Ting Xu, ‘Efflorescence in Tang-Song China’, URKEW Working Paper, available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/Research/URKEW/papers/Ting.pdf, 
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‘forging ahead’ will largely depend on whether China could continue promoting diversity and 
break through the equilibrium state.  
This is not to say that all Italian city states of the Renaissance were based on the same 
political model as Florence. Also in Venice the corporatist – profession-based – element of 
power and rule was important (the Venetian guilds were called Corporazioni). The de juris 
ruler of Venice – the Doge – was elected in an extremely intricate process insuring the 
absence of corruption, verging on paranoia in its absurd complexities, but the power of the 
Doge was very limited. Not even able to leave Venice without the consent of the Senate, the 
Doge was normally a professional businessman who virtually had to give up his business 
when he was elected. Being a Doge was a duty to the Polis, so Venice is probably the political 
system which has come closest to the old wisdom of giving power only to those who do not 
want it. In this philosophy wishing power automatically disqualifies one from public office. 
Limited by the political power of the guilds, the composition of the Venetian senate was 
sufficiently open to new powerful players to create a circulation of elites in Pareto’s and 
Schumpeter’s sense. Both the Florentine and the Venetian systems were created with built-in 
checks and balances, to achieve – in John Kenneth Galbraith’s felicitous term – a balance of 
countervailing powers. In both states a very large number of citizens served in the government 
bodies for very brief periods. Again, diversity was a key element in governance.    
The key element in the growth of European welfare, however, was that literally hundreds of 
different states – each exhibiting more or less despotic tendencies – were in intense 
competition in war, in luxuries and in intellectual prowess.  
In the United States antitrust laws, starting in the 1890s, and the 1934 Glass Steagall Act are 
examples of laws consciously acting to maintain the diversity which is the basis of 
competition and of the reduction of vulnerability. The Glass-Steagall Act decision that no US 
bank could have offices in more than two federal states is a crystal clear recognition that the 
diversity of banks – having a large number of banks – is the best insurance policy against 
financial crises. After the abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act, the crisis that started in 2007 has 
proved beyond doubt how wise this legislative emphasis of diversity was. It should be noted 
that the Communications Act of 1934 similarly limited the number of newspapers and radio 
stations that one company or group of companies could own. This was a parallel decision to 
maintain diversity, also in this case in order to save democracy.    
How Lack of Diversity Stifles Development. 
Not only is technological change a very undemocratic process, it is also often not very well 
understood even by the people who are very close to what is happening. Before the advent of 
electrical light, people who would have been consulted as to what direction research on 
lightening should take would probably have suggested inventing a kerosene lamp that 
produced less black soot. On the other hand, Chinese water clocks are an example of a dead-
end technological trajectory, one of the lines that never reached the right hand wall in Figure 1. 
The alternative to the water clocks, mechanical clocks, were invented in the West. 
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An important feature in the history of technology is that even the persons near the inventions 
did not initially see their full potential. The steam engine was initially just seen a pump for 
drawing water out of mines, and in the early days microprocessors only found use in hearing 
aids.Werner von Siemens never thought electricity would be used in homes, and in 1943 
IBM’s chairman Thomas Watson thought there might be a world market for five computers.   
So it is important that many more ideas than those which in the end succeed are being 
promoted. All organisms tend to produce more offspring than can possibly survive, a process 
which Darwin gave the name ‘superfecundity’. These offspring are not all alike. On the 
average the members of a species that do survive will be more fit to survive the ruling 
conditions than those who do not survive. Similarly, a human society which produces a 
superfecundity of ideas and approaches to solving problems – as did Europe during the 
Renaissance – will by definition also produce many more solutions which will be tried out in 
government offices and by market actors. A society which is content with things the way they 
are and only perpetuate the ideas on which present status quo is founded will block the 
superfecundity that is at the root of the selection mechanisms behind progress. So, almost by 
definition, the centralization policies of the European Union would tend to limit the 
superfecundity of ideas.            
 
 
 
Figure 2. Low Complexity vs. High Complexity Evolutionary systems. 
Source: Gould, Stephen Jay, Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, p. 171. 
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In figure 2 we again find the left-hand wall where evolution begins. From here the Age of 
Bacteria evolved into the Age of Invertebrates, followed by the Age of Fishes, Reptiles, 
Mammals, and finally, The Age of Man. If we draw a parallel to the subsequent periods 
within the Age of Mankind, of Stone Age, Bronze Age, etc, developing into what Christopher 
Freeman and Carlota Perez have called techno-economic paradigms.  
In spite of so many early technologies actually having been developed in China first – from 
gunpowder and paper currency to movable type printing37  – it was Europe that led the world 
into the Industrial Revolution. It is also normally accepted that the science and art of public 
administration was first perfected in China.38 We argue that a key explanatory variable here 
was the presence of diversity in Europe and the absence of diversity in China at the time. 
Because of its lack of diversity, China got stuck in what Gould calls a low-complexity system. 
The superfecundity that creates the many alternatives from which selection of technological 
solutions takes place was stopped. The lack of superfecundity, and a parallel diversity of 
national approaches in which the selection takes place, would tend to keep societies in the 
simple ‘bacterial’ mode. The rare events – or mutations – which produce the great leaps 
forward will simply not be present.       
The extreme centralization of China severely diminished diversity and caused society’s decay 
into a low-complexity system. On the other hand, starting in 15th century Italy a ferocious 
European inter-state competion in war, luxuries and art made the continent into a high 
complexity system39, into a large scale laboratory where thousands of ideas – for everything 
from war machines to water wheels – were continuously tested against each other.  
One sad conclusion may be that China’s lack of geographical expansionism – its peacefulness 
– may have contributed to its decay. Two decisions stand out here: 1. The decision to 
discontinue interoceanic shipping after the disasterous naval expedion against Japan in 1371 
and 2) the decision to pay the Mongols not to attack rather than fight back under the Song 
(960-1279) ( the role of the Chinese Wall was to protect from this invasion). 
As David Landes wrote once, the two alternative explanations of the supremacy of the West 
tend to be either that “we (the West) are so good and they so bad; that is we are hardworking, 
knowledgable, educated, well-governed, efficacious and productive, and they are the reverse”. 
The other story is that “we are so bad and they so good: we are greedy, ruthless, exploitative, 
aggressive, while they are weak, innocent, abused, and vulnerable”.  From the perspective of 
this paper, both explanations have an element of truth in them. At the root of China’s falling 
behind and the forging ahead of the West lies a key element of diversity, partly attributable to 
China’s lack of expansion and desire for peace (i.e. paying the Mongols not to attack) and the 
diversity of the myriad of European nations competing not only in intellectual prestige – e.g 
housing competing philosophers – and in luxury, but also competing among themselves in 
war.       
                                                
37 See Needham 1956. 
38 For a discussion, see Drechsler, Wolfgang, „Three Paradigmes of Governance and Administration: Chinese, 
Wester, and Islamic“, The Other Canon Foundation and Tallinn University of Technology Working Papers in 
Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics, No. 50, 2013. 
39 See Sombart 1913a and 1913b for an early statement of this.  
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As Europe and the West now are becoming the laggards, the military activities of the West are 
accompanied by falling wages at home, while China seems to be gaining a technological edge 
in key areas like energy under strong wage growth. That the West fails to understand why 
Europe and the US got rich – not through free trade but through emulation and national 
competition in production40 – may constitute an important stumbling block for the future, as 
the West may have to protect its industries in order to protect its living standards. It is also in 
the interest of China that purchasing power in the US and Europe does not fall.         
 
The Political Implications of the Need for Diversity – or, reinventing the spirit of 
Giovanni Botero (1544-1617). 
The European reaction to the rest of the world as it became known, starting with the 
Renaissance, was initially the opposite of later eurocentrism. The most famous of the Jesuit 
fathers who went to China was Matteo Ricci () (1552-1612), who not only translated 
the Bible into Chinese, but also the writings of Confucius into Latin. This idea of mutual 
respect and reciprocity – the latter a term we know from so called ‘primitive’ societies – was 
an intellectual hallmark of early European contacts with China which continued through most 
of the European Enlightenment until the decade of the 1770s. This decade saw both the 
expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America and from China, where they –as good 
anthropologists – came to be seen to identify too much with the native population and were in 
the way of European expansion as it became increasingly imperialistic.  
Giovanni Botero, a contemporary of Matteo Ricci and also a Jesuit, became a very early 
economist and social scientist. The places of his early publications – Würzburg (Germany), 
Cracow (Poland), and Milan – testify to the pan-European nature both of the church and of 
academic life at the time. In spite of the laudable programs for student exchange in Europe – 
like the Erasmus Programme – the percentage of foreign students at European universities 
were bigger at the time of Ricci and Botero than it is today.  
Botero not only was the first scientist to observe the importance of diversity for the creation 
of wealth (Sulle Grandezze delle Cittá, 1589), he was also the first to produce a general 
description of the nations of the world (Relazioni Universali, 1599). Botero’s description of 
the different countries and cultures of the world reads like a celebration of Nature’s diversity. 
The Lapps in Northern Scandinavia are celebrated for their ability as archers, their ability to 
make boats without nails, and for having the fastest means of transportation in any culture, the 
reindeer sleigh on snow. How sadly different is the European attitude to their remaining 
aboriginals today! The key element here is not any loss of a “romantic” view of other cultures, 
it is the lack of respect for diversity, as if the Fordist cult of standardization had become a 
permanent feature of Western culture. Individual diversity is tolerated and even encouraged, 
but in the West a left-over of the 20th century Fordist mind-set is that tolerance is often  based 
on ‘we are all alike’ instead of ‘we are all different’.  
                                                
40 See Reinert, Sophus, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011 
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Botero writes on China with the same respect he gives to aboriginal culture like the Lapps, but 
he marvels at the immense size of the country, its ‘70 million inhabitants’, the land and 
irrigation, the “marvellous industry”, and the fact that nothing gets wasted (“not a palm of 
land nor a gram of product”). ”There is no country (on earth) who studiously better manage 
their government, and which have better organized the punishments and the bounties” says 
Botero.41 The generalized admiration of China which was found in European culture until 
around the 1770s is not generally known today.42 At the time the admiration for China was 
much more marked in France and Germany than in England.           
We now potentially face a situation where the West apparently is falling behind in inventing, 
just as China was in the 17th century, and the roles will again be reversed. If, at the same time, 
the West aims at dominating the world created in its own partly anachronistic and Fordist 
image, this will lead the wrong direction. Western dominance grew in the age of the Havana 
Charter (late 1940s to late 1970s) when Third World nations were encouraged to industrialize. 
This would have created a world of symmetrical dependence, and potentially of mutual 
respect. Presently Western political power is bound to decline if the West insists that the rest 
of the world shall emulate its political structure without allowing this rest to emulate its 
economic structure (as was possible during the rule of the Havana Charter). The Havana 
Charter came to an end when neo-liberal economics gained the upper hand, reintroducing 
context-free and diversity-free Ricardian economics, and particularly trade theory. Having 
kept an industrialization strategy in place since the late 1940s, India, China, and other East 
Asian countries form an exception from the rest of the Third World. Under these diverse 
circumstances it is high time the West brings back an understanding of diversity – that 
economic structure will be reflected in political structure – and that the prospects of a Western 
dominated Globalistan 43 are far from tempting to many. In this sense understanding and 
respecting diversity is a precondition peace.   
This paper starts with a quote from Stephen Jay Gould’s book Full House. Towards the end of 
this volume Gould – perhaps the most celebrated biologist of the last generation – states that 
his model “does teach us to treasure variety for its own sake”44. This should be our goal 
across a whole range of fields, from political diversity and cooperation between equals, to 
research and the preservation of biological diversity. Having lost diversity as China once did, 
we fear that the West will be losing out to China in a similar way that China lost out to 
Europe 400 years ago.  
If a goal is both to eradicate world poverty and to prevent the West from gradually declining 
into a society with an economic structure that once characterised feudalism – huge differences 
between a wealthy few and the poor masses – we must rediscover how the West once 
managed to develop in symmetrical diversity, while at the same time China declined. 
Understanding this it will also be understood that it is not in the interest of any of the parties 
that the West be deindustrialized.   
                                                
41 Relazioni, 1622 edition, pp. 106-107.  
42 For an overview, see Maverick, Lewes A. China as a Model for Europe, San Antonio: Anderson, 1946.  
43 Escobar, Pepe, Obama does Globalistan,  
44 Gould, op. cit., p. 229.  
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